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8 April 1966

PERSONAL LEADERSHIP: AN ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER

By

EDWIN J. McCARREN

Lieutenant Colonel, Armor

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Personal Leadership: An Element of National Power

by

Lt Col Edwin J. McCarren
Armor

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
8 April 1966

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SUMMARY

This study explores the personal leadership of Nehru of India and Magsaysay of the Philippines with a view toward determining the impact their leadership had on the security of the United States. It also draws some general conclusions which may be of value in dealing with leaders of other emerging nations.

Although the situation existing in India and in the Philippines was markedly different in many respects, there were striking similarities: both gained independence from a colonial power; both had large dissident elements; in both economic conditions were chaotic; and both required to commit their armed forces early.

Fundamentally the leaders were different, but yet they had many common characteristics. Nehru was from a wealthy elite family, was well educated, and was a writer and philosopher of note; Magsaysay was a peasant whose education was at best spotty, and he was politically immature. Nehru concentrated on industrialization at home and played a leading role in international affairs; Magsaysay concentrated on domestic issues, specifically raising the standard of living of the poor. Nehru was an adamant proponent of nonalignment; Magsaysay favored military alliances and close cooperation with the United States.

In spite of these fundamental differences, both were highly nationalistic; both were strong personalities who provided the leadership so critically needed in the unstable years after independence; both were men of unquestionable integrity who enjoyed the implicit faith of their people; and both were committed to solidifying the emerging nations of Asia.

This study concludes that both Nehru and Magsaysay did contribute to the security of the United States. Nehru's stability and maturity exerted a stabilizing influence in Asia; his objectivity and his refusal to join the East contributed, at least in a negative sense; and his personal prestige and power made him a valuable mediator between East and West.

Magsaysay, through defeating the Huks made the Philippines the showcase of democracy in Asia; his leadership and his pro-American attitude probably prevented the Philippines from becoming a neutral; and permitting US bases on Philippine soil contributed directly to the security of the United States.

This study tends to highlight four aspects of emerging nations which merit consideration in dealing with them:

1. Most have a sense of distrust of any kind of foreign influence. In the early years they are likely to blame their failures on their former masters.

2. They tend to be ultra-nationalistic. While they may profit some from our experiences, imposition of our ways on them draws resentment. They must be permitted to solve their own problems in their own way.

3. They are anxious to participate in international affairs and are unwilling to align themselves because it restricts their activity.

4. While they are maturing, a one-party system or even a dictatorship may provide the required stability and may serve the long range interests of the United States better than a democracy.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The delineation of the elements of national power varies widely from author to author, however, there is general agreement that the basic elements of national power include the economic, political, military, geographic, demographic, technological, and leadership bases. National power is defined by Stoessinger in his The Might of Nations as follows:

Power in international relations is the capacity of a nation to use its tangible and intangible resources in such a way as to affect the behavior of other nations.

Most of these bases can, in general terms, be quantitatively assessed for comparison purposes. Leadership, however, defies quantitative evaluation, and yet it is this element of power which makes the policy decisions, frequently creates the external image of a nation, and, in the final analysis, is the element which may have a fundamental and lasting impact on the power balance of a nation, a region, or the world.

We have seen actual or potential powers which did not exert the influence in world affairs which their relative power could have permitted. Conversely, nations with a relatively limited power base have exerted a degree of influence in international relations completely disproportionate to their power base.

This study will explore the impact of personal leadership as an element of national power in two nations with a view toward determining those traits, circumstances, or conditions, if any,

which were held in common and the impact their respective leaders had on the national security of the United States. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India and President Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines are the subjects of this study.

The paper is organized into four chapters. The second and third chapters deal with a leader and his country. Within each of these chapters the discussion is divided into the following four major sections:

The first section deals briefly with the background and political life of the individual prior to his emergence as a national leader.

The second section reviews conditions existing in the nation at the time the leader became prominent or assumed control. Selected elements of national power are also discussed.

The third section deals with the impact of the leader on his nation and with selected situations in which personal leadership appeared to play a dominant role.

The fourth section is a discussion of the impact of the leader on the national security of the United States.

Chapter 4 is an analysis of the impact of Nehru and Magsaysay on their respective nations and on the world. Hopefully, this analysis will reveal some indicators which may be of value in evaluating and dealing with similar leaders in the future.

CHAPTER 2

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU (1889-1964)

Jawaharlal Nehru was born on 14 November 1889 in Allahabad, India. His father, Motilal Nehru, was of Kashmiri Brahmin descent, was a most distinguished Indian lawyer, and was a millionaire.¹

Nehru's early education was by private tutor until 1905 when he traveled to England and enrolled in Harrow. In 1907, he entered Cambridge University where he studied chemistry, geology, and botany, winning a second class honors degree in Natural Science Tripos in 1910. The following two years he studied law at the Inner Temple in London. Upon successful completion of this work in 1912 he returned to India.²

Nehru's youthful political observations date back to the early days of his childhood when he listened to his elders discuss the overbearing character and insulting manners of the British rulers. He said, "I was filled with resentment against the alien rulers of my country who misbehaved in this manner; and, whenever an Indian hit back, I was glad."³

At the age of ten he became interested in the Boer war and later the Russo-Japanese war. One comment he made in this vein is, "Nationalistic ideas filled my mind. I mused of Indian freedom and Asiatic

¹Current Biography, 1941, p. 606.

²Vera Micheles Dean, Builders of Emerging Nations, p. 87.

³Dorothy Norman, ed., Nehru--The First Sixty Years, Vol. 1, p. 24.

freedom from the thralldom of Europe. I dreamed of brave deeds, of how, sword in hand, I would fight for India and help in freeing her."⁴

While in England, Nehru's concern with India's plight and his intense desire to work for her freedom obsessed him. His strong nationalistic feelings and his desire for positive radical action are evidenced in his letters to his father.

Upon return to India in 1912, Nehru joined the Indian National Congress. The Congress, organized in 1885, was initially a moderate organization advocating parliamentary government for India.⁵ As it grew in strength and stature it became the organization with which the British dealt in discussing political subjects and such topics as reforms with the Indians.

Perhaps one of the most significant events in Nehru's life was his first meeting with Mahatma Gandhi, who was to become the religious leader of his people and the most powerful Indian during the latter years of British rule. He described his initial impression as follows: "I was simply bowled over by Gandhi, straight off. . . . I worked as kind of a secretary to (him). . . . I was searching for some (satisfying) method of action."⁶

From their early meetings until Gandhi's assassination in 1948 Nehru was a disciple of Gandhi and Gandhi was probably Nehru's strongest supporter. In many ways this was an odd relationship

⁴Ibid., p. 5.

⁵Hugh Seton Watson, Neither War Nor Peace, p. 77.

⁶Tibor Mende, Nehru: Conversations on India and World Affairs, p. 24.

because their views were divergent on several fundamental issues. For example, Gandhi was a religious (Hindu) leader of his nation; Nehru was an agnostic. Gandhi believed the future of India lay in the return of the Indians to a "village way of life"; Nehru was equally adamant that India should move forward through industrialization and other economic modernization processes. In spite of their apparant fundamental divergencies of opinion, their long range views and ultimate goals were the same.

During the period from 1918 to 1945 Gandhi and Nehru worked tirelessly, principally through the Congress, for India's independence. As early as the late 1920's, Gandhi expressed the wish that Nehru should become the political leader of India.⁷ During these years Nehru was imprisoned by the British eight times for a total of thirteen years, the last term from August 1942 to June 1945, for openly opposing British policies and for insisting upon independence for India.

Perhaps the 1945 creed of Nehru can be summed up in the words of the editor of India's Freedom as revealing three enduring strands of his thought: his hatred of imperialism, of domination of any country by another; his undoctrinaire socialism, the ideal of government for the benefits of all without regard to vested interests; and, of course, his vision of India as a free nation solving her own problems in her own way.⁸

⁷Norman, op. cit., p. x.

⁸Barnes and Noble, India's Freedom, Forward.

Nehru expressed his views on socialism in these words:

"Socialism is for me not merely an economic doctrine which I favor; it is a vital creed which I hold with all my head and heart."⁹

THE INDIA NEHRU RULED

In December 1945, the British government declared its intention to grant India dominion status with the option of withdrawing from the Commonwealth. The most pressing problem was the drafting of a constitution which was acceptable to the two major religious factions, the Hindus and the Moslems. The primary issue was whether India should remain a united country with its heterogeneous population of Hindus, Sikhs, and Moslems or whether the six states which were primarily Moslem should form a separate state of Pakistan. After months of bitter controversy and after Britain stated she would withdraw regardless of the outcome, the latter course was accepted and the states of India and Pakistan were formed. Sovereignty was granted at midnight on 14 August 1947. More than 230 years of British rule had come to an end. In agreement with the desires of the Indian people, former Viceroy Mountbatten remained as the Governor General and Nehru as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.¹⁰

The India Nehru ruled was primarily an agrarian nation of 1,250,000 square miles, with a population of 340,000,000, making her one of the most densely populated areas of the world.¹¹

⁹Current Biography, 1941, p. 608.

¹⁰Current Biography, 1948, p. 469.

¹¹Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. 15, p. 28u.

To evaluate properly the role of Nehru's leadership as an element of national power, cognizance must be taken of the domestic situation in India as well as the international climate in the years immediately following her independence.

Domestically, Indian economic conditions were chaotic. The most pressing economic problems were simply to obtain sufficient food, adequate clothing, and minimum housing to provide a subsistence standard of living for her millions. The heterogeneity of her people, the lack of a common language, and the provincial nature of her states seriously complicated her domestic problems.

On the international scene, tensions ran extremely high. The world was divided essentially into two power blocks--the East and the West. Colonialism was still much in the fore in Southeast Asia. A civil war was raging in China with the Chinese Communists advancing toward victory. The Soviets were pursuing an expansionist policy in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe. On the sub-continent the partition of the original state of India into India and Pakistan touched off the greatest mass migration in modern history. Estimates of between six and fifteen million people migrated between the Hindu and Moslem states of India and Pakistan. In this migration casualties from rioting, starvation, and other causes have been estimated as high as 500,000. Maharaja Singh, leader of the state of Kashmir, had acceded that state to India, an act which touched off a bloody religious war and which resulted in the commitment of Indian and Pakistani troops. The subsequent stalemate has existed for more than eighteen years.

It was against this backdrop that the young government of India was in the process of developing its domestic and foreign policies.

THE LEADERSHIP OF NEHRU

Even prior to achieving her independence, Nehru foresaw that the pivotal point of India's policy must be the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major power or group of powers, but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue. Nehru stated in a speech in the Indian Parliament on 8 March 1949 that he felt India could play a large role and maybe an effective role in helping to avoid war.¹²

In spite of the severe domestic problems facing India and the fact that the new nation was still in the embryonic state so far as its government and its role in international affairs were concerned, Nehru realized the dominant role India should assume in Asia. With Nehru, the essential cooperation of Asian nations was perhaps the initial primary goal. Toward this end he organized the Asian Relations Conference which met in New Delhi in March 1947. The purpose of this conference was to forge closer links between the Asian countries, to study and discuss problems of common concern, to organize some machinery for mutual consultation, and to encourage cultural cooperation. This conference was the beginning of what was to become known as the Nehru doctrine or Pan Asianism. The Nehru

¹²Norman, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 459.

doctrine did not envision an Asian block or a Southeast Asian block. That would have had the effect of nullifying Nehru's basic aims, namely peace and nonalignment with power blocks. His purpose was merely the establishment of a regional association within the framework of the United Nations which would provide the vehicle for consultation on items of common interest and for cultural cooperation.¹³

Another step in the development and solidification of the Nehru doctrine occurred during his visit to the United Nations in November 1948. At this time he called a meeting of the Asian delegates to the United Nations, to encourage prior consultations among Asian delegates on agenda items which affected the Asian peoples.¹⁴

A further example of Nehru's leadership in opposing colonialism and in attempting to solidify Asian unity was demonstrated in the Indonesian problem. During the late summer and fall of 1947 the Dutch had been exerting strong military pressure against Indonesia in an attempt to regain control, although the Dutch had granted the Republic de facto recognition in November 1946. Nehru took the initiative in bringing this matter before the United Nations Security Council. Although a cease fire was obtained, the Dutch continued to refuse to recognize the independence of the former colony. Again Nehru took the initiative by calling a nineteen nation Afro-Asian conference in New Delhi for the purpose of bringing pressure on the Dutch. On 2 January 1949 the conference unanimously passed a resolution requesting

¹³Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 310-315.

¹⁴Vidya Prakash Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, p. 6.

the UN Security Council to pass a resolution which provided for the withdrawal of the Dutch, release of political prisoners, non-interference in Indonesian Government affairs, removal of trade restrictions, formation of an interim government, and the election of a Constituent Assembly.¹⁵

India was not strong enough to render any material or military aid to Indonesia; however, Nehru's initiative in calling the Afro-Asian conference successfully mobilized world opinion against the Dutch. This was instrumental in bringing the Dutch to the conference table and in finally gaining sovereignty for Indonesia in December 1949.

Another example of Nehru's firm conviction that cooperation between the Afro-Asian countries was the road to peace and to mutual progress was the Bandung Conference of April 1955.

Nehru, in conjunction with five other national leaders, sponsored the 24 nation meeting. The purpose of the conference was to consider mutual interests and concerns and to find ways and means by which the participants could achieve fuller economic, political, and cultural cooperation.

The conference agreed on ten major points which, in general terms were: respect for fundamental human rights and for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; abstention from interference in

¹⁵Lawrence K. Rosinger, "India in World Politics," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XVIII, 5 Oct. 1949, pp. 229-233.

the internal affairs of another nation; respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the UN charter; abstention from defense arrangements which serve the interests of any big power, and abstention from creating pressure on other countries; refraining from acts or threats of aggression; settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means in conformity with the UN charter; promotion of mutual interests and cooperation; and respect for justice and international obligations.¹⁶

After the conference Nehru remarked that there was reason to be happy about the outcome of the Bandung conference, at which representatives of more than half of the world population had supported these principles, to achieve world peace and cooperation.¹⁷

Nehru's quest for world peace and his hope for a stable Asia are certainly embodied and evident in the results of the Bandung conference. Although the principles agreed upon are lofty (and perhaps naive), it must be argued that had the participants acted in good faith, the current conflict in Southeast Asia, the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, and the Yemen civil war could have been avoided.

As early as the summer of 1949 Nehru demonstrated his firm conviction that India should not become involved in alliances of any type. General Carlos Romulo of the Philippines had been designated to organize a Pacific Union which, in fact, was to be a military alliance to halt

¹⁶M.N. Kaul, ed., "Foreign Policy of India - Texts of Documents," Asian-African Conference Final Communique (April 1955), pp. 170-180.

¹⁷Ibid.

the spread of communism in Asia. Romulo realized that the Union would lose much of its value and force if India did not become a member. Nehru's reluctance to join any military alliance caused Romulo and other participants to water down the pact to "only a continuation of the East Asian Conference" which would be limited to economic and cultural matters.¹⁸ Nehru's stand had the effect of nullifying the desired effect of the Union.

Due to her global conflict with communism and her attendant commitments, the United States position on the Pacific Pact was one of cautious encouragement. At the 18 May 1949 news conference, Secretary of State Dean Acheson admitted that serious dangers to world peace existed in Asia, but that the United States was not currently considering participating in a Pacific Pact. At the 20 July weekly press conference, Acheson praised the efforts of Asian countries toward a Pacific defense union.¹⁹

However, in spite of the fact that the United States was reluctant to commit herself to an Asian defense pact, it was Nehru's refusal to support it that postponed the formation of a SEATO type organization until 1954.

To underscore his adamant stand on peace and on alliances, Nehru in a foreign policy speech to the Indian Parliament on 12 June 1952 stated, ". . . I should like an ever increasing number of countries in the world to decide that they will not have another war, whatever

¹⁸Dutt, op. cit., pp. 42-45.

¹⁹Ibid.

happens. I would like the countries of Asia--I speak of our neighbors--and other countries also to make it clear to those warring factions and to the great countries that are so explosively bitter against each other, that they themselves will remain cool and will not enter the arena of warfare, whatever happens.²⁰

Nehru's adamant position against imperialism and his apparent unshakeable faith in neutralism is demonstrated vividly in these passages from a speech delivered to the Indian Parliament on 23 December 1953: "When I think of military aid freely given from a country of the West, or any other country--to a country of the East, the past history of Asia comes up before me, the history of the colonial domination gradually creeping in here and establishing itself. . . . We want no protection from others. . . . But we do not want any people to protect us with their armies and navies and air forces."²¹

As regards India's position on SEATO, Khrishna Menon in "The Statesman" of 19 April 1954, called the proposal "an incipient and embryonic infringement of our peace area approach."

In another area Nehru exerted leadership in his early recognition of Communist China, and in his consistent attempts to have her seated in the United Nations. After the fall of the Nationalist Government in the late months of 1949, Nehru visited the United States where, in answer to a question regarding recognition of Red China, he stated:

²⁰Vida Prakash Dutt and Vishal Singh, India's Policies and Attitudes Toward Indochina and SEATO, p. 21.

²¹Ibid., p. 25.

"In common with other Governments, we cannot ignore realities."²²

Later in October in Ottawa he said the question had to be considered in the historical context of agrarian revolution, a connection which would not be ignored.²³ On 30 December 1949 India announced recognition of Communist China. Nehru briefly discussed the rationale behind this action in an address to the World Pacifists' Conference on 31 December 1949. Essentially he said that India recognized the new government in China after satisfying itself that it had the support of the people and that it intended to work for the good of the Chinese people. India could not ignore the recent happenings in China. He recognized that the new Chinese government was strong and whether India preferred it or not, whether she liked it or not, whether its fabric was like India's or otherwise, she had to recognize it. As Nehru put it, "We have to maintain our relations with it. It is not a matter of choice."²⁴

A final example of Nehru's ability and willingness to exert power when he felt the cause was just and the events endangered world peace was in late 1956 when the British and the French attacked the Suez canal. His reaction was immediate and intense. He made it clear that if the British failed to withdraw he would dissolve India's ties with the Commonwealth.²⁵ Conversely, during the same period he rationalized Russia's massacre in Hungary as Russian fear of a third world war.²⁶

²²Norman, op. cit., p. 518.

²³Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, p. 15.

²⁴Norman, The First Sixty Years, vol. 2, p. 518.

²⁵Jawaharlal Nehru, The Dynamics of International Politics, p. 542.

²⁶Satyavrata Ramdas Patel, Foreign Policy of India, p. 143.

EVALUATION OF NEHRU'S LEADERSHIP POWER

From the date of Indian independence until his death in 1964 Nehru more frequently than not found himself at odds with the policies of the United States as well as with other major powers, both East and West. No doubt this fact can be attributed to the fundamental differences in national purpose and his rigid belief that a non-aligned India would help promote world peace. Yet, in practically every major crisis which arose, India's position was a factor to be reckoned with, regardless of the size of the other powers involved. Politically, India was young and somewhat immature; economically she was weak, plagued with internal problems that continually forced her to seek foreign assistance; demographically, her 450 million heterogeneous population intensified the economic problems and added little if anything to her power position; militarily, she was weak and had to depend on foreign military aid when her sovereignty was threatened. In spite of her apparent lack of the major elements of national power, India played a leading role in international affairs. It appears the one element which made this possible was her leadership--Jawaharlal Nehru. What attributes or characteristics did this man have which permitted him to exercise this power?

In "Builders of Emerging Nations" Vera Dean says, "Of all builders of emerging nations in the non-western world, Nehru comes the closest to the ideal philosopher-king portrayed, but never discovered in actuality, by Plato."²⁷

²⁷ Dean, op. cit., p. 92.

William E. Shapiro said, "Nehru's dedication to the people of India, and to the still larger cause of humanity, has made him one of the truly great leaders of the 20th Century."²⁸

On 17 December 1956 the New York Times stated, "Even his sharpest critics concede this much: India under Mr. Nehru has become the major counterweight to Communist success in Asia."

In evaluating the personal qualities which contributed to Nehru's leadership and directly to the national power of India, the following appear to hold the key:

He was highly intelligent and exceptionally well grounded in history and in world politics. His thirteen years in prison under British rule provided him the time to study, meditate, and to develop fundamental domestic and foreign policy objectives for India and to chart the course she should play in international affairs.

Nehru's lofty ideals and principles, from which he rarely departed, provided the much needed inspiration for the newly independent Indian people. However, in retrospect, these ideals were much too lofty for the pragmatic world with which he was forced to deal, and when the national interests of India were affected they were set aside. For example, on 18 December 1961, Indian troops marched into the Portuguese colony of Goa, which had been under Portuguese rule for four hundred years. Although a cease fire resolution was before the United Nations Security Council (the organization in which Nehru had so much faith) it was vetoed by the USSR and the conquest was completed the same day.²⁹

²⁸ Encyclopedia Americana, 1962 Annual, p. 312.

²⁹ Encyclopedia Americana, 1962 Annual, p. 358.

Again on 20 October 1962 when Chinese forces attacked south of the McMahon Line, Nehru took action. During the following ten days a state of emergency was declared and almost unlimited power was vested in Nehru and his cabinet by the Indian government. He requested military aid from the United States which was authorized on 29 October. He also requested military aid from Great Britain and from the USSR. Although the USSR promised him MIG fighter planes, she later reneged on her promise because of conflicting commitments to both India and China.³⁰

Perhaps Nehru's domestic power was best illustrated in these two instances in which he completely reversed himself from his stated principles of fourteen years, and yet he received the unqualified backing of his government and his people.

His objectivity and impartiality in international affairs commanded the respect and admiration of most nations. These traits were demonstrated on numerous occasions and they required considerable courage, particularly when the danger to India's welfare was high. For example, when he risked the loss of United States aid by accepting Soviet aid in 1956 and 1957; when he caused postponement of American aid in 1962, in the form of a steel mill, by refusing to permit Voice of America broadcasts over a radio station which had been constructed with United States assistance. He risked the economic advantages of Commonwealth if the British did not withdraw from the Suez in 1956.

³⁰ Ibid., 1963 Annual, p. 324.

He brought down the displeasure of the United States and was not supported by the majority of United Nations members when he recognized Red China and pressed for her seating in the United Nations. Yet, he took this action because he felt, from a practical point of view, he simply could not ignore the fact that the Communists were in firm control of China. As the most powerful nation in Asia and with a common much disputed border with India, it was in the national interest of India to keep normal diplomatic channels open.

Nehru's initiative and willingness to stand up and be counted provided the leadership needed in the Asian block during the emergence and reconstitution of Asian nations during the decade following World War II.

The assumption of leadership in attempting to establish an Asian cooperative organization through the Asian Relations Conference in 1947, his concern over the Indonesian situation for which he called the Afro-Asian Conference in 1949, and in the Bandung Conference in 1955 shows Nehru's insight into and a concern over the long term future of Asian nations in matters which only indirectly affected India.

In summary, Nehru's power, domestically and internationally, appears to have been derived not from the support of a strong organization, but from his personal leadership. His personal attributes of integrity and sincerity, his lofty ideals of world peace and better standards of living for all mankind, his intense dedication to India, his objectivity and impartiality in international relations, coupled

with his willingness to take the course of action in which he believed, regardless of the consequences, combined to permit Nehru to exercise much more power than the national power base of India would seem to permit.

IMPACT OF NEHRU'S LEADERSHIP ON THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

The true impact of Nehru's policies and actions on the security of the United States cannot be evaluated properly at this early date. However, certain tentative conclusions can be drawn:

The stability, continuity, and relative maturity of the Nehru government acted as a stabilizing influence in Asia during the post war decade. Although his intense nationalism, anti-colonialism, and non-alignment policies were at times irksome to the United States, his objectivity and his refusal to join the Eastern block can, at least in a negative sense, be considered as enhancing the security of the United States.

His fundamental objective of world peace and the numerous conferences he organized and attended, as well as the numerous trips he made to nations of both power blocks can only be construed as contributing to the security of both East and West.

Nehru's power and world-wide prestige made him a valuable mediator in East-West issues. His relatively close contact with both the United States and the Soviet Union served as a powerful, reliable channel of communication between the two poles in the then bi-polar world.

CHAPTER 3

RAMON MAGSAYSAY (1907 - 1957)

Ramon Magsaysay was born on 31 August 1907 in a bamboo and cogon grass hut in Iba, the capitol of the province Zambales. He was the second of eight children born to Exequiel Magsaysay, who was a carpentry teacher in the village school¹ as well as a part time carpenter and blacksmith.

When Ramon was six years of age his father was dismissed from the school because he refused to pass the son of the school superintendent who had failed the course.² Upon this dismissal, Exequiel lost what little prestige he had in the village and the family was socially ostracized. Ramon later said, "It seemed to me that no one sympathized with us and that we were all alone."³

Because of the social ostracism, Exequiel moved his family to the village of Castillejos where he opened a small retail store which handled the necessities required by the peasants. When the store failed to produce sufficient profit to support the family, both Exequiel and Ramon went to work on a road construction gang. This provided the capital which the father later used to open a small carpentry and blacksmith shop which supplemented the profits of the store.

¹Carlos P. Romulo, The Magsaysay Story, p. 13.

²Vera Micheles Dean, Builders of Emerging Nations, p. 117.

³Romulo, The Magsaysay Story, p. 15.

Ramon's education can be described as spotty at best, a point about which he was often derided later in life. He attended primary school in his home town and at the age of thirteen he enrolled at the Zambales Academy in San Narciso, twelve miles away. Finances in the Magsaysay household were so critical that Ramon lived in a small hut for which he paid about \$.50 per month.⁴

In 1927 he enrolled in the Academy of Liberal Arts at the University of the Philippines, but he soon became ill from overwork.⁵ After regaining his health, he transferred to Jose Rizal College from which he graduated in 1932 with a Bachelor of Science degree in commerce.⁶ Upon graduation Magsaysay was hired by the Try Tran Bus Company in Manila as a mechanic, from which he eventually advanced to company manager.⁷

When the Japanese attacked the Philippines, Magsaysay enlisted in the 31st Infantry Division. After Bataan fell he joined the guerrilla forces and fought with them for three years. During this period he was promoted to the rank of captain. His effectiveness as a guerrilla leader is attested to by the fact that the Japanese offered 100,000 pesos for him, dead or alive.⁹

By the end of the war Magsaysay had gained recognition not only for his ability as a guerrilla leader, but for his honesty and integrity

⁴Ibid., p. 26.

⁵Dean, op. cit., p. 118.

⁶Romulo, op. cit., p. 35.

⁷Dean, op. cit., p. 118.

⁸Romulo, Carlos P., Crusade in Asia, p. 121.

⁹Romulo, op. cit., p. 52.

as well. Because of these qualities, on 4 February 1945 General MacArthur appointed him Military Governor of Zambales, his home province, a position he held for a year.¹⁰ In this position he soon realized the pitiful lot of the peasant, particularly the tenant farmer. It was at this time that he developed the slogan "land for the landless," which was later to become the keystone of his administration. In February 1946 Magsaysay was discharged from the army and in April of that year he was elected to the House of Representatives from Zambales with the highest majority in the history of that province.¹¹

The unique character of Magsaysay, in comparison to the traditional Philippine political figures of that era, bears mention in order to appreciate fully his accomplishments. First, he was of the peasantry with literally no political training or acumen. He was incredibly honest, frank, and loyal at a time when the charges of corruption in government were vehement and public faith in the ability of political leaders was at its lowest ebb. He was not a lawyer, yet for forty years practically all men elected or appointed to high office had law degrees. He had no organization, family tradition, or money behind him. Where most political leaders were at least partially of Spanish or Chinese origin, Magsaysay was Malay.¹² He was not fluent in Spanish and his lack of command of the English language frequently brought comments and even ridicule from his

¹⁰Leonard S. Kenworthy, Leaders of New Nations, p. 205.

¹¹Romulo, Crusade in Asia, p. 121.

¹²Robert Aura Smith, Philippine Freedom 1946-1958, p. 152.

opponents. Perhaps the most notable difference was that Magsaysay's interests were oriented almost exclusively on the problems of the peasant.

THE NATION

To appreciate fully the leadership of Magsaysay, one must consider the nature of the country and the conditions existing in the years immediately preceding his rise to power. The Republic of the Philippines comprises over 7000 islands and islets of which only 462 are one square mile or larger. The total land area of the country is approximately 115,600 square miles and, generally speaking, it is mountainous in nature. The population, according to the 1948 census, was 19, 234, 182,¹³ comprised of three general racial types; Pygmy, Indonesian, and Malay. More than two-thirds of the population are engaged in agriculture.¹⁴ Although there are numerous native dialects spoken in the Philippines, English is the basis of education and is spoken, generally throughout the nation. About 80% of the people embrace the Catholic faith.

CONDITIONS AT THE END OF THE WAR

The destruction and conditions in general existing in the early post-war years defy avid description. Romulo in "Crusade in Asia" states, the position of the country and the government could hardly

¹³"Philippines," Encyclopedia Americana, vol. 21, p. 748.

¹⁴Frances Lucille Starnes, Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry, p. 9.

have been worse. The Japanese invader had been destroyed, but in his last vicious struggle for survival and in sheer wanton vengeance he had destroyed much of the country's resources. Public buildings were rubble heaps, money was gone, records were burned or lost, schools had vanished. . . . Saddest of all, the morale of the people was at a record low.¹⁵ Inflation, corruption, inefficiency, and graft aggravated the situation which President Roxas described as follows: "There is hunger among us. . . plagues of rats and locusts gnaw at our food supplies. Public health and sanitation have been set back a quarter of a century. Housing is shocking in its inadequacy and squalor, our communications are destroyed, stolen, or disrupted. . . . Schools have been burned and teachers have been killed."¹⁶

According to Smith in "Philippine Freedom," General Eisenhower said that of all the wartime capitals, only Warsaw suffered more damage than did Manila.¹⁷

THE COMMUNIST THREAT

The "Hukbong Magpapalayang Bayan" or Hukbalahap (usually shortened to Huks) which translates "Army of Liberation of the People" was initially organized in the Philippines in the early 1930s by Pedro Abad Santos, a staunch Communist.¹⁸ Its initial target was the

¹⁵Romulo, Crusade in Asia, p. 83.

¹⁶Bryan Crozier, The Rebels, p. 216.

¹⁷Smith, op. cit., p. 115.

¹⁸Romulo, Crusade in Asia, p. 93.

Philippine government and its primary theme was land reform. During the Japanese occupation the Huks were perhaps the most effective guerrilla units opposing the invaders.

At the end of the war the Huks were a large, well organized, force armed with American weapons and with enough ammunition to sustain them through any campaign they might wish to wage. Some of the arms and ammunition had been supplied them during the war or were captured from the Japanese.¹⁹ Any conceivable shortage was readily available from the huge stocks of US materiel left in the Philippines at the end of the war. They oriented their cause on corruption in government, land reform, oppression by the government, and by security forces. The political and economic conditions, plus the moral decay which accompanies an experience such as that undergone by the Philippines, provided an ideal set of circumstances for Communist insurgency. Eventually, the Huks had three types of forces: mobile striking units operating as regular guerrillas; seven regional commands; a local defense corps; an underground support network known as the BUDC. Their strength is evidenced by the fact that in central Luzon the Huks appointed civil officials, collected taxes, established courts, administered justice, established schools and indoctrinated the populace in the revolutionary cause. At one time the Huk leader, Luis Taruc, boasted that he had 30,000 trained Huks under arms and more than a million supporters.²⁰

¹⁹ Romulo, Crusade in Asia, p. 95.

²⁰ Smith, op. cit., p. 143.

Magsaysay later estimated their strength on Luzon at 20,000 with an overall organization of 60,000.²¹

They trained personnel for government duties and organized a "standby" government for each important town which was ready to take over when the Red uprising occurred.²² A politburo was actually working and living in Manila and the target date for takeover had been set for Christmas eve, 1950.²³

It was against this background that Magsaysay began his political career in the Philippines.

THE LEADERSHIP OF MAGSAYSAY

While Magsaysay was still in uniform, President Roxas became cognizant of his political power. Without Magsaysay's knowledge, President Roxas arranged to have him released from the army early. While the papers were being processed, Roxas asked Magsaysay to run on his ticket for the congressional seat from Zambales.²⁴ When Magsaysay refused, Roxas was stunned. Although others urged him to run for congress, he kept refusing until his former guerrillas handed him a petition signed by over 11,000 officers and men.²⁵ When he finally was persuaded he opposed the Roxas candidate, on the Liberal Party ticket. He was elected almost without opposition.

²¹Romulo, Crusade in Asia, p. 97.

²²Ibid., p. 98.

²³Smith, op. cit., p. 147.

²⁴Romulo, The Magsaysay Story, p. 77.

²⁵Ibid., p. 78.

Upon assuming his seat in Congress, Magsaysay was appointed to and later became the chairman of the House Committee On National Defense. The quality of the armed forces and their inability to cope with the Huk problem rapidly became a matter for national concern. Magsaysay was relentless in his criticism of the armed forces.

Because of his criticism and because of his experience President Quirino asked Magsaysay if he were appointed Secretary of Defense if he could get rid of the Huk menace. Magsaysay supposedly said "Yes, Mr. President, I can." Quirino asked him what he would require and Magsaysay replied, "an absolutely free hand."²⁶

With this license he took over the defense portfolio in September 1950.

With characteristic speed and vigor he went to work. On his first day in office he relieved several ineffectual high ranking officers and ordered others who were "arm chair strategists" to the field.

The condition of the Army and the constabulary is worthy of brief note. The constabulary, which was transferred to Magsaysay's command was ineffectual and was viewed by the people more as oppressors than as protectors. Two examples from William O. Douglas' book, "North from Malaya" are extreme cases of army and constabulary brutality, but they are worth citing.

²⁶Smith, op. cit., p. 155.

"One night in Laguna 50 farmers who were attending a dance were lined up and shot by the constabulary because they were suspected of being Huks. On Good Friday 1950 the army, in revenge for the killing of an officer, massacred 100 men, women and children in Bacalar, Pampanga, and burned 130 houses."²⁷ With such conduct on the part of the armed forces, it is little wonder that the Huks were gaining support.

Magsaysay cleaned out and reorganized the army and the constabulary from top to bottom. He made examples of soldiers who conducted themselves improperly--sometimes by having them punished in public. He convinced President Quirino to transfer the entire pacification program to the Defense Department so it could be coordinated properly.

Through personal example, personal leadership in the field and among the peasants, he began to win the support of the people for his army. Although his methods were unorthodox, they were effective. He said in an interview carried by "Newsweek," ". . . I knew you cannot beat guerrillas except by unorthodox tactics. So I launched an unorthodox campaign. Where they used terrorism, I used kindness--plus pesos. Anyone who brought me information I rewarded liberally. Also, I promised to give any Huk who deserted exactly what he claimed he was fighting for--land, house, rice. . . ."²⁸

The economic conditions of the Philippines were critical. In Frank Golay's words, "During the period February to June 1950 the

²⁷Crozier, op. cit., p. 217.

²⁸J. P. McEvoy, "Magsaysay: Dynamic Example for Asia," Newsweek, Vol. 65, Sep. 1964.

economic conditions had deteriorated to the point that without extraordinary budget receipts the civil service, including the armed forces, would go unpaid and minimum governmental services would not be maintained."²⁹

In April 1950 Magsaysay asked President Quirino to send him to Washington to request additional military assistance. In this mission he was doubly successful. After conferring with General Marshall, who consulted the National Security Council and President Truman, ten million dollars of Department of Defense funds were made available to Magsaysay to use as he saw fit.³⁰ He was also successful in obtaining additional funds under the Military Assistance Agreement of 20 March 1947. In the two fiscal years ending 30 June 1954, the Philippines received 47 million dollars, as compared to 20 million in the preceding five years.³¹

With the monetary crisis at least temporarily over Magsaysay continued to campaign against the Huks and to win popular support for the government. Although a detailed treatment of these campaigns is not germane to this paper, a brief description of some of the more significant actions merit consideration.

Shortly after becoming Secretary of Defense he received a message from a man unknown to him asking him to meet covertly, at night, in a hut in the slums of Manila. He arrived unarmed and met with the caller

²⁹ Frank H. Golay, The Philippines, p. 78.

³⁰ Romulo, Crusade in Asia, p. 127.

³¹ Golay, op. cit., p. 82.

in the dark, although he suspected it was a plan to murder him. The fact that he came impressed the Huk and additional meetings were arranged. Magsaysay took advantage of these meetings to attempt to defect the Huk, principally to determine who the politburo members were and where they were located. Eventually he received a call from the man who offered the Politburo information in exchange for a loan of 6000 pesos. Magsaysay agreed, and on the basis of this information a raid was made and twenty-two members of the politburo were captured and one was killed. Additional rewards included 42,000 pesos, five truck loads of documents, a cache of arms and ammunition, and a complete roster of the members of the Communist party in the Philippines.³²

With a revitalized army, Magsaysay decided on a two pronged attack. He offered the Huks "all out friendship or all out force." In a few months the army and the constabulary had killed or captured 12,000 Huks and 10,000 were persuaded to surrender. To those who surrendered the government kept its promise of land, a home, farm implements, and long term credit.³³ The reward system for weapons and Huk leaders also paid off.

The election of 1949 was known as the "dirty election." It was marked by corruption, coercion, murder, and terror. It had done incalculable harm to the national morale and turned thousands of citizens pro-Huk. Magsaysay promised the 1951 election would be known

³²Romulo, The Magsaysay Story, pp. 110-117.

³³Kenworthy, op. cit., pp. 207-208.

as the "clean election."³⁴ He met with stiff opposition from President Quirino and other party leaders, but he insisted that the voters should be protected and that the 1949 election must be erased. To accomplish this end he ordered out soldiers, ROTC cadets, and reserves to guard the ballot boxes and to protect the voters.³⁵ The result was that 4,000,000 people voted and only 21 lost their lives, (as opposed to several hundred in 1949) and the anti-Quirino candidates were voted in to all contested seats and into control of the senate.³⁶

These examples serve to demonstrate the type person and the type actions which reduced the Communist threat in the Philippines from a major national threat to little more than a nuisance in a period of one year. They also stabilized the situation and gained the support of the masses for their government and for law and order.

By 1953 the Quirino government was still corrupt and some of the elder statesmen as well as many of the younger ones, urged Magsaysay to stage a coup d'etat because they feared a bloody 1953 presidential election. Magsaysay had the machinery in the armed forces which by this time almost worshipped him. Romulo quotes Magsaysay as stating, "I know that it is true, as you say, that I can seize the government, should we try. There is no doubt about that in my mind. I should like to point out, however, that if we do this thing it will make us into a banana republic. It would be a precedent we would regret if we allow our young democracy to set out on such a dangerous undertaking."

³⁴Romulo, Crusade in Asia, pp. 140-144.

³⁵Dean, op. cit., p. 118.

³⁶Romulo, Crusade in Asia, p. 142.

No, instead of that, we must assert the democratic processes we all recognize in the fight. Let us all work together to insure a clean election. If all else fails, and we have not tried all else yet, then, let us discuss the problem again. . . .³⁷

On 28 February 1953 Magsaysay resigned as Secretary of Defense. In his letter of resignation, as quoted by Romulo, he said in part: ". . . It would be futile to go on killing Huks, while the administration continues to breed dissidence by neglecting the problems of our masses.

The need of a vigorous assault upon these problems, I have repeatedly urged upon you, but my pleas have fallen on deaf ears. . . .³⁸

With this admonition Magsaysay left the cabinet and prepared to oppose Quirino in the forthcoming presidential election.

In his campaign he took the issues to the people with a grueling grind of visits to an estimated 1100 barrios³⁹ for a total of 3000 hours of speaking. He stressed fundamental issues which would improve the lot of the masses; he spoke to the peasant in terms he could understand. The magsaysay campaign was unorthodox, but it set the style for national and provincial campaigns in later years.

On 10 November 1953 Ramon Magsaysay was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, in a fairly clean election, by the greatest majority in Philippine history--2, 912, 992 to 1, 313, 991.⁴⁰

³⁷Romulo, The Magsaysay Story, p. 192.

³⁸Ibid., p. 193.

³⁹Barrios--as used here is an outlying village or district.

⁴⁰Kenworthy, op. cit., p. 210.

THE PRESIDENTIAL YEARS

Prior to enumerating some of the major policies and projects advanced by Magsaysay, it is useful to note his basic philosophy. In an interview with an American journalist he is quoted by Kenworthy as saying essentially that the mistake the world is making with the simple people is to try to hurry them into political concepts they don't understand and aren't prepared to cope with. I know. I am a peasant myself. When my people can raise their produce and get it to town on decent roads, when they can be cured of their illnesses and buses can take pregnant women to hospitals in a hurry, when they have the necessary water to grow rice so they don't have to import it, then we will think more of their political education. I say spit on the big, fancy schemes. I want all the little things first. Then perhaps we can get on to the bigger things.⁴¹

The basic purposes of his administration are to be found in his inaugural address which he aptly entitled "The General Welfare: Only Justification for the Exercise of Governmental Power and Authority."

". . . In the administration of public affairs, all men entrusted with authority must adhere firmly to the ideals and principles of the Constitution.

I will render--and demand--uncompromising loyalty to the basic tenet of our Constitution; that you, the people, are sovereign. The

⁴¹Ibid., p. 212

rule of government must be service to you. Accordingly, I pledge my administration to your service. I pledge that we shall extend the protection of the law to everyone, fairly and impartially--to the rich and the poor, the learned and the unlettered--recognizing no party but the nation, no family but the great family of our race, no interest save the common welfare. Heretofore, social justice has raised fervent but frustrated hopes in the hearts of our less fortunate citizens. We must not permit social justice to be an empty phrase in our Constitution. We must bring it to life--for all!

In consonance with this purpose, my administration shall take positive, energetic measure to improve the living conditions of our fellow citizens in the barrios and neglected rural areas and of laborers in our urban and industrial centers.

The land tenure system of our country shall be re-examined to purge it of injustices and oppression. 'Land for the landless' shall be more than a catchphrase. We will translate it into actuality.

While I shall give priority to our domestic problems, my administration will not neglect our international responsibilities. We cannot escape the fact that the destinies of our nations are closely linked. It is in this spirit that we regard the good will and assistance extended to us through the various programs of international economic cooperation with the more developed nations, chiefly the United States.

⁴²Ramon Magsaysay, "The General Welfare," Vital Speeches, Vol. XX, pp. 235-236.

We shall continue to cooperate with the United Nations in seeking collective security and a just world peace.

Perhaps the one program most dear to his heart was Rural Reconstruction. His views on the major tenets of this program as well as the progress made toward achieving the goals are contained in his State of the Union message of January 1955. He said, he was approaching these problems along three main lines:

First, improvement of the land tenure system supplemented by land resettlement;

Second, more effective aid to tenants and small farmers in the form of (a) credit on easy terms; (b) essential facilities, such as water and roads; and (c) technical advice on how to improve farm operations; and

Third, more intensive community development with emphasis on self help.⁴³

To implement these programs, Magsaysay organized an Agriculture Tenancy Commission to assist tenants in securing their rights and Court of Agrarian Relations to settle disputes between land owners and tenants. Where legal counsel for the peasant was not available he assigned army lawyers to assist them. He inaugurated a massive resettlement program which provided land, a house, farm implements, seeds, and a small cash loan to those who would resettle in thinly populated areas. The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing

⁴³Ibid.

Administration made credit available to farmers on easy terms, and helped them to set up marketing and warehouse facilities, through the media of local cooperatives. Irrigation projects to reclaim arid land were instituted. An artesian well project to supply potable water was intensely pursued. An intensive highway and feeder road program was begun and a program to improve agricultural and breeding methods was instituted.

The accomplishments of the first year attest to the vigor with which Magsaysay pursued his objective. In his 1955 State of the Union address, Magsaysay noted, among others, the following achievements during his first year: 241,000 hectares of public land was distributed to settlers; 2,822 families were resettled; 232 farmer cooperatives were organized, 9,000 hectares were irrigated under four irrigation projects and seven additional projects were started; 1300 artesian wells were dug; 430 kilometers of feeder roads were built and 479 kilometers were improved; Carabaos increased by 9%.⁴⁴

Comparable progress was made in other fields such as industry.

In the area of foreign affairs, Magsaysay outlined his views in an article entitled "Roots of Philippine Policy" in which he said:

In shaping foreign policy the Philippines is primarily moved by three considerations: first, national security; second, economic stability; and third, political and cultural relations with the free world. Expressed in more detail, these three considerations provide the objectives and the methods of our policy: first, the strengthening of our national security by suppressing subversion from within and building strength against attack from without through

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 3-11.

participation in collective security arrangements with other free nations; second, the utilization of the machinery of our foreign relations for the promotion of our foreign trade and economic cooperation in order to strengthen our domestic economy and to contribute our share to the economic development of a free world; and third, the development of our political and cultural relations with the nations of the free world with particular emphasis on our relations with our Asian neighbors through membership in the United Nations and participation in regional conferences, such as the Manila Conference of 1954 (SEATO) and the Asian-African Conference in Bandung (1955).⁴⁵

By the summer of 1955 anti-American sentiment and "Asia for the Asians" pressure were at their peak. Influential voices were advocating neutralism in foreign affairs. Exceptional pressure was being exerted on Magsaysay from within his party and from the opposition. However, Magsaysay was probably the most ardent supporter of close relations with the United States and mutual defense treaties to guard the independence of free nations in Asia. His reply to the anti-American campaign was contained in an address he made on 4 July 1955 to a private club. According to Romulo, he said: "

Let me say here and now that we cannot flirt with communism, if we want our independence to remain real and secure. . . . Our people want a Philippines strong and stable internally and able to preserve its hard-won independence against external threats, in firm alliance with our great and good friend, the United States of America. . . . I am determined to see to it that our people continue to get what they want.⁴⁶

⁴⁵Ramon Magsaysay, "Roots of Philippine Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 35, Oct. 1954, pp. 29-36.

⁴⁶Romulo, The Magsaysay Story, p. 293.

The fact that his pro-American sentiment was indorsed by the people was evidenced in the 1955 elections which gave him an overwhelming vote of confidence. Of the nine senatorial seats contested, eight were filled with Magsaysay men.⁴⁷

Unfortunately, President Ramon Magsaysay was killed in an airplane crash on 17 March 1957, just three years and three months after assuming office.

EVALUATION OF MAGSAYSAY'S LEADERSHIP

In evaluating the leadership of Magsaysay as an element of national power, cognizance must be taken of the conditions existing in the Philippines at the time he began his political career as compared with the conditions existing at the time of his death. Only then can a judgment be made on his impact on the power balance of nations.

At the end of World War II, the Philippines were still, in effect, a colony of the United States, and still very dependent on the mother country. This archilepago of more than seven thousand islands received her independence less than a year after World War II. The country had been devastated by the war and the Japanese occupation; economic standards for the peasant were just above the subsistence level; the bulk of her population was demoralized; the government and its agencies were corrupt, inefficient, and oppressive; and a large, well led, well trained, and well equipped communist insurgent force was

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 297.

steadily gaining strength and popularity. These are the ideal conditions under which an insurgency can prosper. Yet, primarily through the leadership of one man, the Philippines was brought from the verge of a communist takeover to become the showcase of democracy in Asia.

What attributes or characteristics did this man have which permitted him to accomplish this remarkable feat? It would appear that personal qualities and convictions coupled with practical programs to realize these convictions held the key. The most noteworthy of these are:

He had an unshakeable faith in democracy as a way of government and in democratic institutions. He was willing to take any measures, even to endangering his own life, to achieve democracy in the Philippines and to strengthen the position of the free world. For example, when critics brought him to task for permitting United States bases on Philippine soil, he replied: "In agreeing to United States bases on Philippine territory, the Philippines was thinking not only of her own security, but of contributing her humble share to the defense of the free world."⁴⁸

His personal courage, honesty, integrity, and complete disdain for corruption of any kind provided the spark which was to turn the tide from communism to democracy. His ability to demonstrate these convictions, regardless of personal consequences, translated these

⁴⁸Magsaysay, Roots of Philippine Policy, p. 32.

personal traits and convictions into meaningful examples of action which the peasants understood and accepted. Perhaps the most dramatic example was his use of troops to guarantee clean elections in 1951, even though he did not really have the authority to take the action and he defied his President in doing so.

A basic key to his success was his understanding of the peasant, his almost fanatical determination to improve the peasant's lot, and his ability to communicate with him. An example of his social welfare credo when he was President is quoted by Corpuz as "Those who have less in life should have more in law."⁴⁹

Another aspect of Magsaysay which contributed significantly to his leadership was his complete lack of prejudice, bias, or smallness toward the former mother-land, the United States. His faith in democracy and in the United States as the principal protector of democracy was tenaciously defended when powerful, more narrow-minded critics, both within his government and in the opposition, advanced such ideas as "Asia for the Asians," and puppets of the United States. In an article Magsaysay stated:

World freedom is, I believe, gaining strength. The genius and God given resources of America have made her the main source of strength for that freedom. . . . Let the original, the true spirit of America always dominate her relations not only with this country but with all free nations. For a free world which depends so much on the United States for strength, that is the best guarantee for understanding, security, and freedom.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Onofre D. Corpuz, The Philippines, p. 112.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 35-36.

Magsaysay's initiative, his willingness to stand up and be counted, and his willingness to take controversial issues to the common man did much to gain support for his programs and to seat the Philippines securely in the Western block.

IMPACT OF MAGSAYSAY'S LEADERSHIP ON THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

The degree to which Magsaysay, as a person, enhanced the security of the United States is impossible to appraise precisely, but most certainly he made a very substantial contribution. Among his major contributions were:

1. He was the first Asian leader to defeat communism in his country. This success, he hoped, would serve as an example to other Asian nations such as Indonesia.
2. He maintained implicit faith in the motives of the United States and defended them both at home and abroad. By doing so he may have prevented the Philippines from becoming a neutral.
3. He contributed significantly by permitting US bases on Philippine soil.

Perhaps the contribution to US security made by Magsaysay and the esteem in which he was held by US leaders is indicated by the statements made by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles at the time of his death.

President Eisenhower said, in part:

In the tragic death of President Magsaysay, the people of the Philippine Republic as well as those of the United States and the entire free world have lost a valiant champion of freedom. . . . A staunch advocate of independence for his people, President Magsaysay was also an active and determined fighter against communism. . . .⁵¹

Secretary Dulles said in part: ". . . . He also provided a glorious example to the whole of Asia, and indeed to the world of wisdom, courage, and success in overcoming the Communist menace. . . ."⁵²

A further tribute to Magsaysay's contribution to the free world was the issuance by the United States of a commemorative stamp in his honor. On this occasion President Eisenhower said in part:

. . . . I submit, not only to my fellow countrymen here today, but to all of the people representative of other countries, if we are really to do our full part in combating communism, we must as a unit stand not only ready, as Magsaysay did, to bare his breast to the bayonet, if it comes to that, but to work day by day for the betterment--the spiritual, moral, intellectual, and material betterment--of the people who live under freedom, so that not only may they venerate it but they can support it.

This Magsaysay did, and in this I believe is his true greatness, the kind of greatness that will be remembered long after any words we can speak here will have been forgotten.⁵³

Secretary Dulles said in part:

. . . . But he saw liberty as a need for all. So when Indochina was threatened by the

⁵¹US Dept of State Bulletin, Messages of Pres. Eisenhower and Sec of State Dulles at the time of Magsaysay's death, Apr. 8, 1957, p. 563.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³US Dept of State Bulletin, Remarks of Pres. Eisenhower and Sec of State Dulles on US commemorative stamp honoring Magsaysay, Sep. 16, 1957, p. 472.

Communist armed aggressors, the Philippine Republic was among the first to volunteer for a common defense. And it was in Manila, under his auspices, that the Southeast Asia security treaty was signed and the Pacific Charter proclaimed, whereby the member nations dedicated themselves to promote human liberty and to make secure the political independence of the area.⁵⁴

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 473.

CHAPTER 4

IMPACT OF NEHRU AND MAGSAYSAY ON THEIR NATIONS AND ON THE WORLD

GENERAL

Although India and the Philippines were drastically different in many important aspects, there are several striking similarities which posed similar problems for the leaders.

First, both nations were just emerging from colonial status, and although both had enjoyed a degree of autonomy, both had depended heavily on the colonial power. Consequently, new political institutions and procedures were required to support their new constitutions. The Philippines had been occupied by the Japanese for three years; the Indians, under British rule, had not held high government posts although some lesser ranking posts and administrative offices were allocated to Indians. Nehru had spent the last three years of the war in a British prison. In the drastically changed and rapidly changing world into which they emerged, domestic and foreign policy had to be framed, leaders had to be developed, and the machinery of government overhauled. Consequently, there was a degree of political immaturity during the early years.

Both countries had large dissident elements which actively opposed the government: the Huks in the Philippines; the Moslems in India, particularly in the Kashmir dispute. So both nations were forced to commit their armed forces at a time when they could ill afford to do so.

Both had critical economic problems and the early goals of both governments were of the survival nature; food, housing, sanitation, water, and roads.

DIFFERENCES IN THE LEADERS

In analyzing these leaders one is immediately impressed with the marked differences between them.

Nehru was from an elite, wealthy family. He was well educated in a foreign university, a philosopher of note, and politically mature.

In contrast, Magsaysay was almost an opposite, being of peasant stock, without financial resources, not very well educated, and politically immature.

Nehru concentrated considerable effort and time to international affairs. His influence was felt directly or indirectly in practically all major world crises. Domestically, he emphasized the industrialization of his nation.

Magsaysay believed the security of his nation and of Asia could be maintained only through military alignment with the West, the United States being the principal partner.

SIMILARITIES IN THE LEADERS

While the differences in these two leaders may appear to be extreme on the most fundamental issues, there were striking similarities in their personal traits and in their attitudes. These common traits

and attitudes may well be the factors which permitted them to exercise effective leadership.

Both Nehru and Magsaysay were highly nationalistic and dedicated to one fundamental purpose; the well being of their nation.

Both were strong independent personalities who were willing to face any opposition, at home or abroad, to realize the ideals which they held. These strong personalities provided the leadership so critically needed in the unstable years after gaining independence.

Both were men of unquestionable integrity who made every effort to keep their promises to their people. They were intensely interested in the common man and, as a result of these qualities, they enjoyed the implicit faith of their people.

Finally, both Nehru and Magsaysay were committed to concrete action to solidify the emerging nations of Asia and Southeast Asia. While it is true that their means for accomplishing a confederation of Asian states were quite different, their underlying purpose was the same--the consolidation and cooperation of Asian nations.

HOW LEADERSHIP ENHANCED NATIONAL POWER

In concluding this analysis and comparison of the leadership of Nehru and Magsaysay, it appears their personal leadership did contribute significantly to the national power of their respective nations in three general ways:

The personal stature of both men drew a divided people into a cohesive nation at a critical time in history when communist aggression was taking place in Asia, the Middle East, and in Eastern Europe.

Through their leadership these two nations constituted showcases of democracy in an unstable region of emerging nations. Their leadership constituted a symbol for their own people and, indeed, for all the peoples of Asia.

Their philosophies both added to the national power of their nations.

Nehru's incessant search for world peace and his leadership in the nonaligned nations added to the prestige of his nation.

Magsaysay's insistence on close cooperation with the United States, his efforts to bring additional Asian nations into military alliances, and his willingness to permit United States bases on Philippine soil increased significantly the national security of the Philippines.

IMPACT ON THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

From the above discussion it is apparent that the leadership of Nehru and Magsaysay contributed significantly to the US security.

Although the contributions of Nehru are less definitive, he did control communism in India; he did develop a democratic government; he continuously sought for world peace; he acted as a mediator between East and West; and his initiative in the non-aligned block may have

prevented some of the Afro-Asian nations from drifting further to the left than they did. However, it should be noted that the luxury of neutralism could not have been afforded had it not been for the national power of the United States.

The contributions of Magsaysay to US security need little or no elaboration. Suffice it to say that he did bring the Philippines from the brink of communism to the showplace of democracy in Southeast Asia. His personal traits, his programs, his profound belief in democracy, and his strong pro-American feelings were largely responsible for changing what could have become a communist enemy nation into a staunch ally.

CONSIDERATIONS IN DEALING WITH EMERGING NATIONS

In view of the number of nations which have gained independence during the past decade, it would be useful for United States strategists to stop and ponder those factors which influenced the attitudes and actions of Nehru and Magsaysay toward the United States. Hopefully, such consideration would provide trends or guidelines which may be useful in dealing with other emerging nations.

Most emerging nations have certain common characteristics which merit serious attention and study in devising unilateral policies and courses of action to be followed:

First, most new nations have for long periods of time been subjected to the control or at least influence of foreign powers. This

tends to engender a national spirit of distrust and dislike of any form of foreign influence. In the early years they can be expected to blame the former master for their failure to reach their aspirations early. In most cases some of the blame can be justified, but, for the most part, they are experiencing the normal growing pains of any new, complex, unfamiliar enterprise. However, this natural hostility must be recognized and taken into account in dealing with them. India and the Philippines are fine examples of this point.

Second, because of their pride in their new found freedom and sovereignty they tend to become ultra-nationalistic. This may be explained by their fierce determination to solve their own problems. Perhaps it is merely to conceal or disguise their mistakes or ineptness in handling the complex problems for which they are inexperienced and often poorly trained. While it is true that they may profit from the experience of the United States, care must be exercised to insure we do not impose ourselves upon them. This will serve to draw resentment and perhaps repulsion. Only through experience with their own culture, resources, political system, and leadership talent will they gain sophistication. It must be borne in mind that regardless of the size and power of nations, in a democratic society all nations are sovereign and the more powerful cannot dictate its will or impose its methods on the weaker without the weaker nation's consent. All nations have different national interests. Policies and actions which are desirable for the United States are not necessarily good for an emerging nation, particularly from the viewpoint of an inexperienced government.

Third, due to the nationalism and inexperience of the government of emerging nations, they can be expected to flirt with nations and ideologies which are inimical to the best interests of the United States. Again, this may be attributed to such factors as that they are fledglings and anxious to contact and explore the various political and economic systems to determine the type they feel will permit them to progress most rapidly; they are anxious to become a part and to play a role in the international drama. Alignment with a power block restricts their activity and exposes them to the charge of being puppets. Perhaps the most fundamental consideration is the inability to convey a complex political system such as democracy to people who have little or no political acumen. When one considers that there is little agreement among statesmen of the United States on what our national purpose and our objectives really are, it is little wonder that emerging peoples fail to assimilate them. Consequently, in dealing with new nations we must appreciate their state of development and that a democratic form of government or direct alignment with the West may not be in their best national interest. Indeed, a one-party system, an oligarchy, or even a dictatorship may provide the stability the state requires during its period of emergence. In the long run such a political structure may better serve the national interests of the United States.

EDWIN J. McCARREN
Lt Col, Armor

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